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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This work deals with a dynamical model able to represent the 
equilibrium of a monopolistic market which is characterized 
by the presence of a counterfeiter. The formalization of the 
behaviours of the economic agents (the monopolist, the 
counterfeiter and the consumers) leads to a first order linear 
difference equation system, whose solution describes the 
dynamical equilibrium of the market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Some authoritative international organizations (U.S. International Trade 
Commission and Comité Colbert) have recently pointed out the increasing influence 
played by the counterfeiting in several modern economies. In particular, by 
deceptive counterfeiting we mean the counterfeiting of goods and services in order 
to fool the consumer on their originality.  
Notwithstanding the importance of such a feature, counterfeiting is mainly 
analyzed in literature by static models (at least to the best of our knowledge). In this 
work we propose a dynamical model able to represent the equilibrium of this kind of 
monopolistic market. The formalization of the economic agents’ behaviour leads to a 
linear, finite difference equation, whose solution describes the dynamical 
equilibrium of the market. 
The present work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
dynamic relations arising among the economic agents, that partly refer to the so 
called pedlar model (Mossetto (1992)). In Section 3 we present the dynamic system, 
whereas we discuss the conditions for the convergence to the constant equilibrium 
level in Section 4. Some final remarks that represent suggestions for a future 
research are discussed in Section 5. 
 
 
 
2. DYNAMIC BEHAVIOUR 
 
 
 We develop a relatively simple model which considers the dynamic relations 
arising among the economic agents.  
Even if the model considers two producers that compete in the market, like 
the duopoly of Cournot, it incorporates different assumptions about the underlying 
structure of the market and behaviour of firms. 
 The economic agents’ behaviour may be summarised as follows: 
 
Step 1 - At time t t= =0 0:  the counterfeiter begins to produce and sell counterfeited 
goods. He satisfies that part of consumers’ demand that has not been satisfied 
by the monopolist. 
Step 2 - At time t t= 0 consumers, who are unable to distinguish the original trade-
mark from the counterfeited one, purchase the total quantity, i.e. the sum of 
quantities offered by both the monopolist and the counterfeiter. 
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Step 3 - At time t t t= = +1 0 1:  the monopolist notices that the market’s price at the 
previous instant was not the right one: therefore he becomes aware of the 
counterfeiter’s presence. In order to maintain his reputation, he carries out 
costly investments. We may consider investments in marketing strategies, for 
example advertising expenses in order to spread information on 
counterfeiter’s presence among the potential consumers’ population. The 
monopolist maximises his profit at time 1t , according to his current cost 
structure. 
Step 4 - At time t t t= = +1 0 1:  consumers react to the reputation investments which 
have been carried out by the monopolist (usually by diminishing the total 
demand).  
Step 5 - From the instant 1: 10 +== ttt  the process restarts from Step 2. 
 
 
2.1 Dynamic demand function 
 
Let us consider the following linear demand function in a counterfeited 
market: 
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with  
0>a , ,0 >b  R∈k  and d ≥ 0, 
 
where 
 
y l( )   is the demand at time l , 
y lFo ( ) is that part of the demand which is satisfied by the counterfeiter, at 
time l , 
k  is the consumers’ reaction to the investments on reputation made by 
the monopolist.  
d  is the monopolist’s reaction to counterfeiting, in terms of investments 
on reputation. 
)(, ly eoF  is the counterfeited quantity that the monopolist expects at time l . 
 
The above equation takes into account that the economic agents’ reaction to 
counterfeiting is supposed to be linear and that for all time 0:0 =< tt  the agents’ 
behaviour coincides with the classical one. We can state the following observations: 
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Remark 1: investments on reputation linearly depend on monopolist’s expectations 
about counterfeiting, at time t: 
 
 )1()()( , −⋅≡⋅= tydtydtI oFeoF . (2) 
 
Remark 2: consumers’ reaction, in terms of total demand, linearly depends on the 
monopolist’s investments at the same time: 
 
 ))1(()( −⋅⋅=⋅ tydktIk oF . (3) 
 
Remark 3: for all 0:0 =< tt , given  that 0)( =tyoF  and 0)1( =−tyoF , equation (1) 
gives the classical inverse demand function 
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Whereas, at time  0:0 == tt , given that  
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the initial price is  
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2.2 The monopolist’s behaviour 
 
 We assume, as implicitly noted before, that there is only one trade mark 
owner whose decision problem consists of choosing the level of output that he 
wishes to sell, in order to maximise his profit. The monopolist maximises profit by 
setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, as usual 
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)(tRM M  is the monopolist’s marginal revenue at time t , which is equal to the 
derivative of monopolist’s total revenue )(tRTM , 
)(tCM M  is the monopolist’s marginal cost at time t , which is equal to the 
derivative of monopolist’s total cost )(tCTM . 
 
Although we do not discuss these issues here, we point out that the 
monopolist’s total cost structure generally differs from that of counterfeiter, even if 
marginal costs are assumed to be equal, i.e.  
 
)()( tCTtCT FM ≠  (in particular )()( tCTtCT MF < );  CMM(t)=CMF(t)=CM(t). 
 
 
Marginal revenue and marginal cost 
 
from a differential increase in the 
quantity can be expressed as follows (Corazza-Funari (1996)): 
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0 < <c a  
 
From condition (7) we obtain the monopolist’s optimal quantity at time t, 
which we denote by )(ty oM : 
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Remark 4: we observe that for all t t< =0 0: , equation (11) gives the monopolist’s 
classic optimal quantity 
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whereas at time t t= =0 0: , because 
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we observe the following monopolist’s initial optimal quantity 
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2.3 The counterfeiter’s behaviour 
 
At time t counterfeiter’s behaviour is assumed to be as follows 
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with 0 1≤ ≤f , 
 
where 
f  is the percentage of the demand which may be satisfied by the 
monopolist but that is actually satisfied by the counterfeiter. 
)(ly eS  represents the value of the demand that the counterfeiter expects that 
the monopolist could theoretically satisfy at time t. 
)(, ly eoM  represents the counterfeiter’s expected value about the monopolist’s 
optimal quantity at time l  and 
y lS ( )  represents the socially optimal (competitive) output level. 
 
Remark 5: counterfeiter’s quantity at time t is assumed to linearly depend  on the gap 
between the counterfeiter’s expected value about the socially optimal output 
level and the value he expects about the monopolist’s optimal output level, at 
same time t. 
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Moreover, let us assume that 
 
 )1()1()()( , −−−=− tytytyty oMseoMes . (17) 
 
Some remarks on ys(t) are necessary: ys(t) represents the consumers’ demand 
that the monopolist could theoretically satisfy. By denoting by [ ])(ly∏  the 
monopolist’s profit at time l, it follows that: 
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Given the demand function which has been introduced in section 2.1, it is 
possible to prove that ys(t) is the output level such that 
 
 ))(())(( tyCMtyp ss = . (19) 
 
 
Using equations (1), (10) and condition (19) we find that the socially optimal 
quantity at time t is given by 
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(20) 
 
 
Finally, by substituting (20) into equation (15) we obtain the following 
counterfeiter’s quantity1 
 
                                         
1
 Counterfeiter’s decisions about quantity do not derive from an optimization problem, as for the monopolist. 
A counterfeiter’s optimizing behaviour might be inserted in the model by choosing a suitable parameter f, i.e. 
by choosing [ ]1,0∈f  as to exogenously maximize his net benefit. 
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3. THE MODEL 
 
 
From equations (11) and (21) we obtain the following linear difference 
equation system  
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Given the previous first order linear system of two difference equations, we 
can get the following second order linear difference equation which specify the 
dynamic of the monopolist’s optimal quantity 
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The general solution of (23) is obtained by adding a particular solution of (23) 
to the general solution of the homogeneous part of the previous equation:  
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Where 
 
y tM Gen
o
,
( )  represents the general solution of (23), 
y tM Par
o
,
( )  represents a particular solution of (23), 
y tM Omo
o
,
( ) represents the general solution of the homogeneous part of equation 
(23), i.e. by setting 0=γ  in (23): 
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3.1 Homogeneous solution 
 
Let us begin with the homogeneous equation (26). It can be proved that the 
general solution y tM Omoo , ( ) is given by 
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where 
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with 1λ , 2λ   the two characteristic roots of the quadratic characteristic equation. By 
the superposition theorem,  1λ  and 2λ  are to be linearly combined each with its 
arbitrary constant c1 and c2, so that the solution of the homogeneous part of (23) is 
tto
OmoM ccty
 
22
 
11, )( λλ += . On the other hand, if 21 λλ =   (i.e. if. 042 =+=∆ βα ), 
the homogeneous solution is given by tto OmoM tccty λλ 21, )( += . 
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Remark 6: it is possible to prove that 
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3.2 Particular solution 
 
It is possible to prove that a particular solution of (23) is the following 
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Remark 7: it is possible to prove that if *kk ≠ , then 
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If  *kk < , then 
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Remark 8: if there is not counterfeiting ( f = 0), the solution of (23) is equal to the 
solution of the classical monopoly, i.e. 
 12
 
 y t yM Omo
o
M Omo
o
, ,
( ) = =0 , y t a c
c b
yM Par
o
M Par
o
, ,
( )
'
=
−
+ ⋅
=
2
  
(34) 
 
 y t a c
c b
yM Gen
o
M Gen
o
, ,
( )
'
=
−
+ ⋅
=
2
. 
(35) 
 
 
 
4. STABILITY CONDITIONS 
 
 
Since the non homogeneous term in (23) is constant the particular solution 
(31) is given by the steady state value y tM Eo , ( ), i.e. 
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The convergence of the time-path of solution )(tyoM  to solution y tM Eo , ( ), the 
steady-state constant equilibrium level, depends on the nature of the two 
characteristic roots 1λ  and 2λ . Each characteristic root must be less than unity in 
absolute value for the path to converge. 
 
We can state the following theorem: 
 
Theorem: The equilibrium (36) is asymptotically stable if 
2
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Proof: 
 
• For kk ~<  the homogeneous solution is  
)sencos()( 21, θθρ tctcty to OmoM += , 
where ρ  is given by: 
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asymptotically stable for all kkk ~ˆ << . 
 
• For kk ~=  the homogeneous solution is  
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2
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 obtain that the equilibrium is asymptotically stable for kk ~= . 
• For kk ~>  the homogeneous solution is tto OmoM ccty
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with 1λ  and 2λ . defined as in  (28). Since 11 <λ  for *kk <  (k* is 
defined as in (33)) and 12 <λ  for 2λkk < ( 2λk  defined as in  (38)), 
giving that *
2
kk <λ  we conclude that the equilibrium is 
asymptotically stable for 
2
~
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We notice that 
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We can summarize the previous results as follows: 
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             Asymptotic stablity  
 
 
with 
2
 , 
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~
λkkkk defined as in (30), (33), (37) and (38). 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OPEN ITEMS 
 
 
 In order to obtain  
 
 y tM
o ( ) ≥ 0, y tFo ( ) ≥ 0 and 0)( ≥tp   ∀ ≥ =t t0 0   
 
we need to define some criterion able to detect a proper range for k. 
 
Moreover, it could be interesting to generalize our model by consider time-
varying parameters )(tf , d t( )  and k t( ), instead of constant ones, in order to permit 
to each economic agent to pursue a dynamical policy. 
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